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Shareholder agreements govern the relations among shareholders in privately-held ￿rms,
such as joint ventures or venture capital-backed ￿rms. We provide an explanation for the
use of put and call options, tag-along rights, drag-along rights, demand rights, piggy-back
rights, and catch-up clauses in shareholder agreements. We view these clauses as serving
(1) to induce the parties to make ex ante investments, (2) to preclude ex post transfers by
the party that has the ability to engage in such transfers, and (3) to achieve the e¢ cient ex
post allocation of stakes in the ￿rm. (JEL: G34).
Keywords: Shareholder Agreements; Investment; Transfers; Trade Sale; Renegotiation;
Put Options; Call Options; Tag-along Rights; Drag-along Rights; Demand Rights; Piggy-
Back Rights; Catch-Up Clauses.1 Introduction
Shareholder agreements specify the rights and duties of shareholders when those prescribed
by law and regulation are thought not to be appropriate. Shareholder agreements are used
mostly when at least some shareholders are actively involved in managing the company.
Examples of shareholder agreements include the joint venture and venture capital contracts
that govern joint ventures and venture capital-backed ￿rms, respectively.1
Shareholder agreements generally grant the parties the following rights: the option to
put their stakes to their partners or to call their partners￿stakes, in part or in whole, at
a strike price that is typically equal to ￿ fair￿value; tag-along rights (or co-sale agreements)
which allow the parties to demand of a trade buyer buying their partners￿stakes the same
treatment as received by their partners; drag-along rights which allow the parties to force
their partners to join them in selling their stakes to a trade buyer in the case of a trade
sale; demand rights (or registration rights) which allow the parties to force their partners
to agree to taking the ￿rm public in an IPO; piggy-back rights which allow the parties to
demand to be included in an IPO in proportion to their stakes in the ￿rm; and catch-up
clauses which maintain the parties￿claims to part of the payo⁄ from a trade sale or an IPO
when the parties have ceded their stakes to their partners following the partners￿exercise
of a call option.
We provide an explanation for these clauses in a dynamic moral hazard setting. We
view the clauses as serving (1) to induce the parties to make ex ante investments, (2) to
preclude ex post transfers by the party that has the ability to engage in such transfers,
and (3) to achieve the e¢ cient ex post allocation of ownership stakes in the ￿rm.2 In the
absence of the relevant clauses, renegotiation arising from the need to preclude ex post
1Standard shareholder agreements are described in Bernstein (1988), Freedman (1994), Martel (1991), and
Stedman and Jones (1990). Joint venture contracts are described in Herzfeld and Wilson (1996), Linklaters
et al. (1990), and Scott (1999); and venture capital contracts in Bartlett (1994) and Stedman and Jones
(1990). Contracts appear to be strikingly similar across countries and legal systems (Martel, 1991). See
Appendix 1 for a brief description of the clauses most commonly found in shareholder agreements.
2An earlier version of the paper allowed all parties to engage in ex post transfers. Many of the results
were similar, but few unambiguous predictions could be obtained because of the large number of cases to
consider.
1transfers from the ￿rm, to sell the ￿rm to a trade buyer, or to take the ￿rm public in an
IPO may distort ex ante investments. When the parties￿initial stakes in the ￿rm cannot
be adjusted to o⁄set the distortion due to the expectation of renegotiation, the clauses
we discuss serve to maintain the parties￿incentives to make the ex ante investments by
structuring renegotiation in such a way as to maintain the parties￿shares of the payo⁄.
We show that put options maintain the parties￿shares of the payo⁄ when the parties￿
stakes in the ￿rm must be altered in order to preclude ex post transfers from the ￿rm. Tag-
along rights deny the parties the ability to increase their share of the payo⁄ by threatening
to sell their stake to a trade buyer who would decrease the value of the ￿rm, or by preceding
the other parties in selling their stake to a trade buyer who will increase the value of the
￿rm. Drag-along rights deny the parties the ability to increase their share of the payo⁄ by
threatening to hold out on a value-increasing trade sale. Demand rights deny the parties
the ability to increase their share of the payo⁄ by threatening to veto a value-increasing
IPO. Piggy-back rights deny the parties the ability to increase their share of the payo⁄ by
including a disproportionate fraction of their own shares in the IPO of the ￿rm. Call options
perform a similar role to put options when the problem of ex post transfers is replaced by
that of ex post investment. Catch-up clauses deny the holders of a call option the ability
to use the option to increase their share of the gains from a trade sale.
Each clause can be viewed as an option. The strike price of each option is determined
endogenously after the valuation is realized. The option is explicit in the case of the put
and call options, and implicit in the case of the remaining clauses. In particular, drag-along
rights and catch-up clauses are forms of call options, whereby a party can call his partners￿
stakes. Tag-along rights are a form of put option, whereby a party can put his stake to a
trade buyer. These (implicit) options are state-dependent, for their exercise is dependent
on the appearance of a trade buyer. The state-dependency of the options is important, for
it avoids the simultaneous exercise of con￿ icting options and con￿nes the optionholder￿ s
ability to exploit the strong bargaining power conferred by the option to the state in which
the option can be exercised. This is in contrast to the state-independent bargaining power
conferred by ownership.
2N￿ldeke and Schmidt (1995, 1998) consider the use of options to solve the hold-up
problem.3 They show that options can solve the hold-up problem under the assumption
that a contract can be written imposing in case of default a speci￿c trade at a ￿xed price.
Instead, the options in our paper impose a speci￿c allocation of stakes and have endogenous
strike price. Our paper further di⁄ers from N￿ldeke and Schmidt in allowing for the presence
of a third party, the trade buyer. This allows us to account for the clauses intended to
prevent the parties from exploiting the presence of the trade buyer to increase their share
of the payo⁄.
Joint ventures and venture capital have received much attention in the academic lit-
erature.4 However, only recently has the literature considered some of the clauses found
in shareholder agreements. Aghion, Bolton, and Tirole (2004) provide an explanation for
drag-along rights, demand rights, and piggy-back rights based on the desire for liquidity.
The focus on liquidity is appropriate for venture capital investments which are generally
sold in a public o⁄ering, but perhaps less so for joint ventures investments which rarely
are. That similar clauses are found in joint venture and venture capital contracts suggests
that there may be more to these clauses than the desire for liquidity. Kahan (2000) values
various forms of the right of ￿rst refusal, which gives the remaining partners priority over
a trade buyer in buying a departing partner￿ s stake. Hauswald and Hege (2004) ￿nd that
joint venture contracts that include explicit options are more likely to depart from 50-50
ownership. Hauswald and Hege interpret their ￿nding to imply that the protection options
a⁄ord minorities makes parties more willing to contemplate minority positions.
To illustrate our analysis, we consider the joint venture contract between General Motors
(GM) and Fiat S.p.A (Fiat).5 Fiat owns 80% of Fiat Auto, and GM the remaining 20%.
3The hold-up problem arises when ￿rm-speci￿c investments make the parties vulnerable to opportunism
on the part of their partners. See Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1988, 1990), and Williamson
(1985).
4Allen and Phillips (2000), Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995), Darrough and Stoughton (1989),
Hauswald and Hege (2002), McConnell and Nantell (1985), Mohanram and Nanda (1998), Oxley (1997),
Pisano (1989), Rey and Tirole (1998), and Robinson and Stuart (2002) study various aspects of joint ven-
tures and alliances. Aghion, Bolton, and Tirole (2004), Bergl￿f (1994), Cornelli and Yosha (2003), Dessein
(2002), Gompers (1995), Hellmann (1998, 2001), Inderst and M￿ller (2004), Kaplan and Str￿mberg (2002,
2003), Kirilenko (2001), Neher (1999), Repullo and Suarez (1998), and Schmidt (2003) study various aspects
of venture capital contracts.
5The contract can be found on http://media.gm.com/images/0010￿ling.htm. Our rendering of the con-
3The contract grants Fiat the right to put its 80% stake in Fiat Auto to GM, for a period
commencing 42 months and ending 9 years after the signing of the contract. In the event
Fiat and GM cannot agree on a strike price for the option, the price is set equal to ￿Fair
Market Value.￿Fair market value is based on the valuation conducted by two and possibly
four investment banks, each bank having conducted its valuation alone. In case Fiat should
arrange for the sale of its stake in Fiat Auto to a third party, the contract grants that party
the right to ￿drag￿ GM ￿along￿ ￿ subject to what is akin to a right of ￿rst refusal by
GM.6 Conversely, the contract grants GM the right to ￿tag along￿Fiat in the sale to the
third party. The contract can be extended up to a total period of 19 years. In case it is
not, or at the conclusion of the 19-year period, the put option and the other rights expire.
GM then has the right to demand of Fiat the listing of Fiat Auto in an IPO. The purpose
of our analysis is to shed light on the allocation of options and rights in contracts such as
this. Why, for example, does Fiat have a put option rather than GM a call option? Note
that the protection of minority shareholders explanation of such clauses would predict that
it would be GM as minority shareholder who would hold the option to put its stake to Fiat
as majority shareholder.7
We proceed as follows. We present the initial setting in Section 2. In Section 3, we
consider the situation that would prevail in the absence of the clauses and the problems
that may then arise. We then proceed to show how the various clauses we consider can
remedy these problems. We analyze the case where ownership of the ￿rm should remain
with the founding parties in Section 4, and that where it should be transferred to a trade
buyer in Section 5. We establish the result that the clauses taken together elicit the desired
ex ante investments in Section 6. We then consider a number of applications and extensions.
We analyze the case where the ￿rm should be taken public in an IPO in Section 7. We
consider ex post investment rather than transfers in Section 8. We consider the joint venture
contract between GM and Fiat in Section 9. We conclude in Section 10 by discussing the
tract, here and in Section 9, is necessarily simpli￿ed.
6Note that we do not consider the right of ￿rst refusal in the present paper.
7Indeed, Lerner and Schoar (2003) ￿nd that private equity contracts in emerging markets often include
the option for minority investors to put their stakes to the majority owner. Minority investors readily admit
that these put options are intended to protect them from expropriation by the majority owner.
4similarities and di⁄erences between shareholder agreements and the rules and regulations
that govern tender o⁄ers and the sale of control blocks. Appendix 1 contains a brief overview
of the clauses found in standard shareholder agreements. Appendix 2 contains a number of
proofs.
2 The initial setting
Two parties a and b jointly start a ￿rm. They sign a contract that allocates initial stakes ￿
to party a and 1 ￿ ￿ to party b. The contract may include put and call options, tag-along
rights, and drag-along rights.8 The put and the call require the setting of a strike price. This
is typically taken to be what contracts refer to as the ￿ fair￿value of the ￿rm. Shareholder
agreements therefore include a clause outlining how this value is to be determined. A
popular option is to delegate valuation to an external expert, such as an investment bank
or a ￿rm of accountants. Alternatively, the clause may set out a formula for how value is to
be determined. For the purpose of our analysis below, it is not necessary that the valuation
be perfect, but that it be unbiased. We consider the fair value of the ￿rm as the value of
the ￿rm under the conditions that result from the exercise of the option.
Each party must make a non-contractible investment towards the success of the ￿rm.
Let in denote the investment made by party n at a cost 1
2cni2
n, n 2 fa;bg.
Once the investments have been made, the ￿rm can remain the property of the two
founding parties a and b, or one or both founding parties can sell their stake to a trade
buyer t in a trade sale. We assume that the trade buyer has no bargaining power when
bargaining with one or both founding parties.
There are two possible states: the state st, in which the acquisition of a majority stake
in the ￿rm by the trade buyer increases the value of the ￿rm, and the state sf in which
8We shall brie￿ y analyze demand rights and piggy-back rights in Section 7. This is because the analy-
sis of demand rights and piggy-back rights closely follows that of drag-along rights and tag-along rights,
respectively. We analyze catch-up clauses in Section 8.
5such acquisition decreases the value of the ￿rm.9 We denote pt the probability of state st
and pf the probability of state sf, pt + pf = 1. We say that the ￿rm is in use u = t when
the trade buyer has acquired a majority stake in the ￿rm or the entire ￿rm. We say that
the ￿rm is in use u = f when the trade buyer has acquired a minority stake in the ￿rm or
none at all.
The value of the ￿rm in use u 2 ft;fg and state s 2 fst;sfg is Vu (s)min[ia;ib] ￿
Vu (s)I.10 From the de￿nition of the states st and sf, we have Vt (st) > Vf (st) and Vf (sf) >
Vt (sf).
We consider the possibility of value-decreasing ex post transfers from the ￿rm. The
transfers we have in mind are very general. They may take the form of what Johnson,
La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer (2000) call ￿tunneling￿￿ theft by the majority
owner of the ￿rm. They may consist in having one or the other owner use know-how it has
acquired from the ￿rm to compete with the ￿rm. They may consist in having the minority
owner use any blocking power it may have to frustrate even value-creating initiatives on the
part of the majority owner, if these should adversely a⁄ect the minority owner.
Regardless of the speci￿c nature of the transfer, we assume that only one party can
engage in a transfer. This assumption simpli￿es the analysis and delivers clear testable
implications as to which party should have what rights under what circumstances. We
consider in turn i) the case where one of the two founding parties, say party a, can engage
in transfers and ii) the case where the trade buyer t can do so.
A transfer decreases the value of the ￿rm by a constant fraction ￿, 0 < ￿ < 1, from
Vu (s)I to Vu (s)I (1 ￿ ￿) in use u 2 ft;fg and state s 2 fst;sfg. The bene￿t of the
transfer to the party that has engaged in the transfer is ￿Vu (s)I￿. Transfers are value-
decreasing: ￿ < 1. However, as the full cost of the transfer is shared by the owners of the
9The subscript f stands for founding: it is used to refer to a situation in which ownership of the ￿rm
should remain with the founding parties.
10We have chosen to use the Leontie⁄ production function I ￿ min[ia;ib] because it has the property that
the ￿rst-best investments can be induced even under joint ownership (Hauswald and Hege, 2004; Legros and
Matthews, 1993). This allows us to concentrate on transfers ￿ see below ￿ and on the trade sale as the
unique causes of the departure from e¢ cient investment, and on the role of the clauses we discuss in avoiding
such departure. In an earlier draft of the paper, we used a more general concave production function. We
obtained similar results, but the notation and the exposition were much more cumbersome.
6￿rm whereas the bene￿ts are received only by the party that has engaged in the transfer, a
party that has a stake ￿ (respectively 1 ￿ ￿) in the ￿rm will engage in a transfer if ￿ > ￿
(respectively ￿ > 1 ￿ ￿). We assume that ￿ > 1
2. This implies that only by giving a party
that has the ability to engage in transfers a majority stake in the ￿rm ￿ or by buying him
out completely ￿ can that party be deterred from engaging in transfers.
We note that the interpretation of ￿ > 0 as transfer can be changed to one of ￿ < 0
as investment, in which case a party that has a stake ￿ (respectively 1￿￿) in the ￿rm will
not make a value-creating ex post investment if ￿ > ￿ (respectively ￿ > 1 ￿ ￿). We have
chosen the former interpretation because transfers have been a foremost concern of parties
in joint ventures (Doz and Hamel, 1998; Reich and Mankin, 1986). We return to the latter
interpretation in Section 8.
We allow the founding parties a and b to renegotiate the original contract after the
state is realized but before transfers or a trade sale have taken place. Renegotiation takes
the form of a standard asymmetric Nash bargaining game, in which parties a and b have
bargaining power ￿ (s) and 1 ￿ ￿ (s), respectively. Note that bargaining power may vary
with the realized state s 2 fst;sfg.
To summarize, the timing of the model is as follows:
￿ At time 0, parties a and b sign a contract that speci￿es the parties￿initial stakes ￿
and 1 ￿ ￿, respectively. The contract may contain clauses that allocate rights to the
parties.
￿ At time 1, parties a and b invest ia and ib, respectively.
￿ At time 2, the state is realized. Parties a and b may renegotiate the original contract
and/or exercise the relevant rights.
￿ At time 3, a trade sale and/or a transfer may take place. The payo⁄s are received.
73 Preliminary analysis absent the clauses
Our purpose in the present section is to discuss the problems that arise in the absence of
the clauses. In the sections that follow, we shall show how the various clauses we consider
can remedy these problems.
In the spirit of backward induction, we ￿rst consider the ex post stakes that prevent
value-decreasing transfers. In state sf, in case party a can engage in a transfer and that
party￿ s initial stake ￿ is less than ￿, the parties renegotiate the original stakes so as to
increase party a￿ s stake from ￿ < ￿ to ￿r ￿ ￿.
In state st, the trade buyer must acquire a majority stake in the ￿rm for the value of the
￿rm to be increased from Vf (st)I to Vt (st)I absent transfers. In case party a can engage
in a transfer, the trade buyer must buy out party a. This is because the requirement that
the trade buyer acquires a majority stake in the ￿rm in state st precludes the prevention
of transfers by party a by giving that party a majority stake in the ￿rm. In case it is the
trade buyer that can engage in a transfer, the trade buyer￿ s majority stake in the ￿rm must
be at least ￿ > 1
2.
We now turn to the investment stage. We consider the ￿rst-best investments iFB
a and
iFB
b . These are the solution to the problem
Max
b ia;b ib


















pfVf (sf) + ptVt (st)
ca + cb
Note that the parties make identical investments at the ￿rst-best. This is because any
di⁄erence in investment jia ￿ ibj would be wasted given the Leontie⁄ production function
min[ia;ib].
8We now show that ￿ if the founding parties can commit to retain their shares in state
sf and to sell them to the trade buyer in state st, and if party a can commit not to engage
in transfers in state sf ￿ the ￿rst-best investments iFB
a and iFB
b can be elicited despite
the problem of double moral hazard (Holmstr￿m, 1982).11 This is because the Leontie⁄
production function makes each party the unique residual claimant to the investment he
makes at the optimum (Hauswald and Hege, 2004; Legros and Matthews, 1993).
Proposition 1 If the founding parties can commit to retain their shares in state sf and to
sell them to the trade buyer in state st, and if party a can commit not to engage in transfers
in state sf, the parties can be induced to make the ￿rst-best investments when given initial




Proof: See Appendix 2.￿
Note that ￿0 7 1
2 as ca 7 cb. The party with higher cost must be given a larger stake
in order to be induced to make the same investment as his lower cost counterpart.
Of course, it is di¢ cult if not impossible for the parties credibly to make such commit-
ments as in Proposition 1, because a founding party that can increase his payo⁄by reneging
assuredly will do so. Renegotiation may ensue, ensuring ex post e¢ ciency but distorting ex
ante investment.12
What then is the value of Proposition 1? The proposition shows that a su¢ cient con-
dition for the ￿rst-best investments to be elicited is to make the founding parties share the
￿nal payo⁄ in the proportions ￿0 = ca
ca+cb and 1 ￿ ￿0 =
cb
ca+cb. Thus, when the state sf is
realized, party a can engage in transfers, and the parties￿stakes in the ￿rm must be altered
from the initial proportions (￿;1 ￿ ￿) to the proportions (￿r;1 ￿ ￿r), the increase in value
made possible by such change must be shared in such a way as to make the parties share in
the ￿nal payo⁄in the proportions (￿0;1 ￿ ￿0). Similarly, when the state st is realized and a
11Note that the conditions speci￿ed are su¢ cient but need not be necessary.
12This is a well-known result. See Hart (1995) for example.
9majority stake in the ￿rm must be sold to the trade buyer, the proceeds from the sale must
be shared such that the founding parties￿shares of the ￿nal payo⁄ are in the proportions
(￿0;1 ￿ ￿0).
It is clear that this will not be the case absent the clauses, for the parties￿payo⁄s in
renegotiation are determined by their bargaining powers, and these will generally not be
such as to make the parties share in the ￿nal payo⁄in the desired proportions. We argue in
the sections that follow that the various clauses found in shareholder agreements have the
e⁄ect of structuring renegotiation in such a way as to maintain the founding parties￿shares
of the ￿nal payo⁄ in the initial proportions, ￿ and 1 ￿ ￿. It then su¢ ces to set ￿ = ￿0 to
obtain the desired shares of the ￿nal payo⁄, thereby eliciting the ￿rst-best investments.13
We consider the situations that arise in each of the two states sf and st, with party a
or the trade buyer having the ability to engage in transfers. For each situation, we show
how the founding parties￿shares would be altered absent any clause, and identify the clause
or clauses that serve to maintain the founding parties￿shares. We assume throughout that
￿ < ￿: only if the inequality is true do ex post transfers by party a constitute a problem.
Transfers by the trade buyer require either ￿ < ￿ or 1 ￿ ￿ < ￿.
4 The state sf: Put options and tag-along rights
We consider the state sf in which majority ownership of the ￿rm should remain with a
founding party. We ￿rst consider the case where it is party a that can engage in transfers,
and derive a rationale for put options in shareholder agreements.
13An alternative to the use of the clauses is to adjust the parties￿initial stakes for the expected e⁄ect
of renegotiation. For example, a founding party that expects to see his share of the payo⁄ decreased by
renegotiation may be allocated a high initial stake in the ￿rm. A limitation of this solution is that the
necessary adjustments to the parties￿initial stakes may be so large as to take these below 0 or above 1. This
will be the case where there is a large discrepancy in the partners￿bargaining power, a far from uncommon
situation. In venture capital, for example, the upper hand generally belongs to the venture capitalist.
Adjusting for the expected e⁄ect of renegotiation may imply giving the entrepreneur an initial stake greater
than 1, clearly an impossibility. Even a stake less than 1 but well above 0:5 may be infeasible because of
control considerations.
104.1 Party a can transfer: Put options
As ￿ < ￿, party a should increase his stake from ￿ to ￿r > ￿. We show in Proposition
2 that a put option held by party b to put a stake ￿r ￿ ￿ to party a at fair value serves
to change the parties￿stakes from (￿;1 ￿ ￿) to (￿r;1 ￿ ￿r) while maintaining the parties￿
shares of the payo⁄ in the initial proportions ￿ and 1 ￿ ￿.
Proposition 2 A put option at fair value serves to change the founding parties￿stakes in
the ￿rm while maintaining the parties￿initial shares of the payo⁄.
Proof: See Appendix 2.￿
Setting the strike price of the option equal to fair value denies both parties any direct
bene￿t from the exercise of the option. This maintains the parties￿payo⁄s in the initial
proportions ￿ and 1 ￿ ￿. Nonetheless, by changing the parties￿stakes from (￿;1 ￿ ￿) to
(￿r;1 ￿ ￿r), the exercise of the option precludes transfers by party a.
Clearly, a call option held by party a to call a stake ￿r ￿ ￿ from party b at fair value
would ￿ if exercised ￿ achieve the same result as the put option just analyzed. However,
such an option would not be exercised by a, who would instead seek to exploit the leverage
he is a⁄orded by the ability to engage in transfers. To see this, note that party a￿ s payo⁄
from bargaining with b is
￿Vf (sf)I (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿Vf (sf)I￿ + ￿ (sf)[Vf (sf)I ￿ [Vf (sf)I (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿Vf (sf)I￿]]
> ￿Vf (sf)I (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿Vf (sf)I￿
> ￿Vf (sf)I (2)
where the last inequality is true by the assumption that ￿ < ￿. As ￿Vf (sf)I constitutes
party a￿ s payo⁄ from exercising the call option, it is clear that a would let the call option
expire and bargain with b.14 Conversely, party b will exercise the put option in order to
14We provide a rationale for call options in Section 8.
11deny party a the bene￿t of exploiting the leverage a is a⁄orded by his ability to engage in
transfers.15
The presence of the trade buyer leaves the preceding analysis unchanged. Neither found-
ing party pro￿ts from selling his stake to the trade buyer. Indeed, the parties would see
their combined payo⁄ decrease if the majority owner were to sell his stake to the trade
buyer, as this would decrease the value of the ￿rm from Vf (sf) to Vt (sf).
4.2 The trade buyer can transfer: Tag-along rights
We now consider the case where it is the trade buyer who can engage in transfers, and
derive a rationale for tag-along rights in shareholder agreements.
We have seen in Section 4.1 that the ability to engage in transfers is a source of leverage
to the party endowed with that ability. We note in the present section that it may also be
a source of leverage to a party who sells his stake to the party endowed with the ability to
engage in transfers.
To see this, denote the founding party that owns a majority stake in the ￿rm by M, and
the founding party that owns a minority stake by m.16 We show that having both founding
parties keep their stakes in the ￿rm is not a Nash Equilibrium. Party m clearly can pro￿t
from selling his stake to the trade buyer when party M keeps his stake. The value of party
m￿ s stake to the trade buyer will be received by party m in its entirety, as the trade buyer
has no bargaining power when bargaining with a founding party. This value is
￿mVf (sf)I (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿Vf (sf)I￿ > ￿mVf (sf)I (3)
15Formally
(1 ￿ ￿)Vf (sf)I (1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿ (sf))[Vf (sf)I ￿ [Vf (sf)I (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿Vf (sf)I￿]]
= Vf (sf)I ￿ [￿Vf (sf)I (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿Vf (sf)I￿ + ￿ (sf)[Vf (sf)I ￿ [Vf (sf)I (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿Vf (sf)I￿]]]
< Vf (sf)I ￿ ￿Vf (sf)I
= (1 ￿ ￿)Vf (sf)I
where the inequality is true by inequality (2).
16M = a and m = b if ￿ >
1
2, in which case ￿M = ￿ and ￿m = 1￿￿; M = b and m = a if ￿ <
1
2, in which
case ￿M = 1 ￿ ￿ and ￿m = ￿.
12where the inequality is true by the assumption that ￿ > 1
2 and the de￿nition of m as the
minority owner, ￿m < 1
2. Party m￿ s gain is party M￿ s loss.17
If ￿M < ￿, party M might pro￿t from selling his stake to the trade buyer when party
m keeps his stake. This would be the case if
￿MVt (sf)I (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿Vt (sf)I￿ > ￿MVf (sf)I (4)
Of course, no sale to the trade buyer will take place in equilibrium, for such sale ￿
whether of a minority stake that a⁄ords the trade buyer the opportunity to engage in
transfers, or a majority stake that lowers the value of the ￿rm absent transfers from Vf (sf)
to Vt (sf) ￿ is value-decreasing. However, the bargaining intended to prevent such sale will
alter the parties￿shares of the ￿nal payo⁄, thereby distorting the parties￿ex ante investment.
Tag-along rights serve to preclude such bargaining. By granting a founding party the
right to make the sale of a stake by the other founding party conditional on the acquisition
by the buyer of both founding parties￿stakes, tag-along rights deny the trade buyer ￿ and
therefore the founding party threatening to sell his stake to the trade buyer ￿ the ability
to pro￿t from transfers. This is because the trade buyer will not engage in value-decreasing
transfers when he is the unique owner of the ￿rm. The highest price the trade buyer can
o⁄er for the entire ￿rm is therefore Vt (sf). As Vt (sf) < Vf (sf), neither founding party will
sell his stake to the trade buyer. We have thus shown
Proposition 3 Tag-along rights deny the parties the ability to increase their share of the
payo⁄ by threatening to sell their stake to a trade buyer who would decrease the value of the
￿rm.
17Party M￿ s payo⁄ becomes
Vf (sf)I ￿ [￿mVf (sf)I (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿Vf (sf)I￿]
< Vf (sf)I ￿ ￿mVf (sf)I
= (1 ￿ ￿m)Vf (sf)I
= ￿MVf (sf)I
where the inequality is true by inequality (3).
135 The state st: Drag-along rights and tag-along rights
We now consider the state st, in which majority ownership of the ￿rm should be acquired
by the trade buyer. Again, we distinguish between the case where party a can engage in
transfers and that where the trade buyer can. We also distinguish between the case where
a is majority owner of the ￿rm and that where b is. We establish a rationale for drag-along
rights and establish an alternative rationale for tag-along rights.
5.1 Party a can transfer: Drag-along rights
We ￿rst consider the case where party a can engage in transfers and a is minority owner of
the ￿rm. As is clear from the de￿nition of state st, both founding parties gain from the sale
of a majority stake in the ￿rm to the trade buyer. A sale must include the sale of party a￿ s
entire stake, for a would otherwise engage in transfers. As a is minority owner of the ￿rm,
b must join a in selling at least part of his stake to the trade buyer.18
We ￿rst show that a concurrent sale by the two founding parties is not a Nash Equilib-
rium. By holding out on a concurrent sale with b, a can appropriate to himself the entirety
of the increase in value made possible by the preclusion of transfers.19 By holding out on a
concurrent sale with a, b can appropriate to himself the entirety of the gains made possible
by the transfer of majority ownership from a founding party to the trade buyer.20;21
18The stake sold by party b must be such as to constitute a majority stake in the ￿rm when combined
with the stake sold by party a.
19Formally
￿Vt (st)I (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿Vt (st)I￿ + [Vt (st)I ￿ [Vt (st)I (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿Vt (st)I￿]]
= ￿Vt (st)I + (1 ￿ ￿)Vt (st)I￿
> ￿Vt (st)I
20Formally
(1 ￿ ￿)Vf (st)I + [Vt (st)I ￿ Vf (st)I]
= (1 ￿ ￿)Vt (st)I + ￿ [Vt (st)I ￿ Vf (st)I]
> (1 ￿ ￿)Vt (st)I
where the inequality is true by Vt (st) > Vf (st).
21Note that there is no incentive for one founding party to precede the other in selling to the trade buyer.
As noted in Section 4.2, the incentive to do so is to exploit the trade buyer￿ s ability to engage in transfers.
14As the sale to the trade buyer is value-increasing, the parties will seek to avoid hold-out
on such sale by bargaining. However, bargaining alters the parties￿shares of the ￿nal payo⁄
and distorts investment.
An alternative to bargaining is to grant the party that would be penalized by bargaining
the right to force his counterpart to join him in selling his stake to the trade buyer. The
counterpart does not do so of his own accord, for his bene￿t from bargaining prompts him
to threaten hold-out. Drag-along rights prevent this.
We have thus shown
Proposition 4 Drag-along rights deny the parties the ability to increase their share of the
payo⁄ by threatening to hold out on a value-increasing trade sale.
What if party a is majority owner of the ￿rm? In such case, only hold-out by a is of
concern. This is because a can appropriate both the gains from precluding transfers and
those from transferring majority ownership to the trade buyer.22 Party b must be granted
the right to drag a along in order for b to maintain his share of the payo⁄.
Recall from Section 4.1 that party b will be granted a put option when party a can
engage in transfers. Does this option allow b at least to dispense with drag-along rights?
The answer is in the negative. The put option precludes transfers by a by granting that
party majority ownership of the ￿rm. But such a mechanism is not applicable to state
st, in which majority ownership should be granted the trade buyer and transfers by a be
precluded by the complete buyout of that party.23
There is not such ability in the present case.
22Formally,
￿Vf (st)I (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿Vf (st)I￿ + [Vt (st)I ￿ [Vf (st)I (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿Vf (st)I￿]]
= ￿Vt (st)I + (1 ￿ ￿)Vt (st)I￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)[Vt (st)I ￿ Vf (st)I](1 ￿ ￿)
> ￿Vt (st)I + (1 ￿ ￿)Vt (st)I￿
> ￿Vt (st)I
where the ￿rst inequality is true by Vt (st) > Vf (st).
23Regardless of whether party a is majority or minority owner of the ￿rm, and whether the put option is
i) exercised by party b before the sale of b￿ s stake to the trade buyer, or ii) threatened to be exercised by
the trade buyer having acquired the option from b along with b￿ s stake, a￿ s payo⁄ from holding out on a
155.2 The trade buyer can transfer: Tag-along rights and drag-along rights
We now consider the case where it is the trade buyer that has the ability to engage in
transfers.
As in Section 4.2, a founding party can seek to exploit the trade buyer￿ s ability to
engage in transfers. If ￿M < ￿, the majority owner M clearly can pro￿t from preceding his
minority counterpart m in selling his stake to the trade buyer, for the value of M￿ s stake
to the trade buyer is
￿MVt (st)I (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿Vt (st)I￿ > ￿MVt (st)I (5)
Party m too can pro￿t from preceding his counterpart in selling his stake to the trade
buyer, if
￿mVf (st)I (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿Vf (st)I￿ > ￿mVt (st)I (6)
Again, as in Section 4.2, a founding party￿ s gain is the other￿ s loss.24 And, as in Section
4.2, the resulting distortion in the founding parties￿shares of the ￿nal payo⁄can be avoided
by granting one founding party the right to tag along the other founding party in a trade
sale. This is because tag-along rights require that the trade buyer￿ s purchase of the founding
concurrent sale with b is
￿Vf (st)I + [Vt (st)I ￿ Vf (st)I] = Vt (st)I ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Vf (st)I
> Vt (st)I ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Vt (st)I
= ￿Vt (st)I
where the inequality is true by Vt (st) > Vf (st). The initial expression re￿ ects the fact that the exercise of
the option i) transforms party a into the majority owner of the ￿rm in case he should initially have been
only a minority owner and ii) precludes transfers by that party.
24For example, if party M should precede party m in selling his stake to the trade buyer, m￿ s payo⁄ would
be
Vt (st)I ￿ [￿MVt (st)I (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿Vt (st)I￿]
< Vt (st) ￿ ￿MVt (st)I
= (1 ￿ ￿M)Vt (st)I
= ￿mVt (st)I
where the inequality is true by inequality (5).
16parties￿stakes be made on identical terms and conditions, thereby ensuring that the parties￿
shares of the proceeds from the trade sale are in proportion to their stakes, speci￿cally ￿
and 1 ￿ ￿. The di⁄erence between Section 4.2 and the present section is that the sale to
the trade buyer is desirable in the present case, as Vt (st) > Vf (st).
We have thus shown
Proposition 5 Tag-along rights deny the parties the ability to increase their share of the
payo⁄ by preceding the other parties in selling their stake to a trade buyer who will increase
the value of the ￿rm.
What if neither inequality (5) nor inequality (6) is true? Clearly, neither founding party
will wish to precede the other in selling his stake to the trade buyer in such case. But would
a founding party wish to hold out on a concurrent sale to the trade buyer? Party m clearly
will not, for he has no leverage absent the ability to engage in transfers. In contrast, party
M will, for he can thereby appropriate the entirety of the gains from transferring majority
ownership to the trade buyer.25 As in Section 5.1, party m must therefore be granted the
right to drag party M along.
Is there a con￿ ict between tag-along rights on the one hand and drag-along rights on
the other? Not on the basis of the discussion in Section 4.2 and the present section. This
is because these two sets of rights operate in exactly the same manner: they force a trade
buyer to treat the two founding parties identically, thereby making it impossible for one
founding party to pro￿t from the presence of the trade buyer at the expense of the other.
There is therefore no scope for con￿ ict between the two sets of rights.
25Party M￿ s payo⁄ from holding out is
￿MVf (st)I (1 ￿ ￿) + [Vt (st)I ￿ [Vf (st)I (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿Vf (st)I￿]]
= Vt (st)I ￿ (1 ￿ ￿M)Vf (st)I (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿Vf (st)I￿
= Vt (st)I ￿ ￿mVf (st)I (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿Vf (st)I￿
> Vt (st)I ￿ ￿mVt (st)I
= (1 ￿ ￿m)Vt (st)I
= ￿MVt (st)I
where the inequality is true by the assumption that inequality (6) is false.
176 Investments and Initial Stakes
The preceding sections have shown that the various clauses we consider structure renegoti-
ation in such a way as to make the founding parties￿shares of the ￿nal payo⁄ equal to the
parties￿initial stakes in the ￿rm, ￿ and 1 ￿ ￿. Using Proposition 1, we can then conclude
that a su¢ cient condition for inducing the parties to make the e¢ cient ex ante investments
is to set the parties￿initial stakes ￿ and 1￿￿ equal to ￿0 and 1￿￿0, respectively. We have
thus shown
Proposition 6 Put options, tag-along rights, and drag-along rights combine with initial
stakes ￿0 = ca
ca+cb and 1 ￿ ￿0 =
cb




7 An extension to demand rights and piggy-back rights
We now consider demand rights and piggy-back rights. For that purpose, we introduce a
new state s = sipo and a new use of the ￿rm u = ipo.26 When the state sipo is realized, the
￿rm should be taken public in an IPO: Vipo (sipo) > Vu (sipo) for u 2 ft;fg. We make the
important assumption that no transfers are possible once the ￿rm has been listed. Thus, we
presume that the various constraints imposed on listed ￿rms by stock exchanges, regulation,
and the law for the purpose of protecting shareholders are e⁄ective at doing so.27
We ￿rst note that there is no need for one founding party to drag the other along in state
sipo: a founding party that sells his stake in the IPO obtains the same payo⁄ regardless of
whether he is joined by the other founding party in such sale. There is the need, however, for
the denial of veto rights over the decision to take the ￿rm public. This is because the party
whose bargaining power is high relative to his stake in the ￿rm would otherwise threaten
to veto the IPO, for the purpose of exploiting his favorable bargaining position to increase
26These could have been introduced in the main model of Section 2, but were not in order to keep the
exposition in Sections 3, 4 and 5 relatively simple.
27This is somewhat of an exaggeration, but may be justi￿ed by comparison with the case of unlisted ￿rms.
18his share of the ￿nal payo⁄.
To see this, consider the two inequalities that would have to hold simultaneously for
neither party to threaten to veto the IPO, when the alternative to the IPO is use u = f,
with the exercise of the put option intended to preclude transfers if party a should be able
to engage in transfers:28
￿Vipo (sipo) > ￿Vf (sipo) + ￿ (sipo)[Vipo (sipo) ￿ Vf (sipo)]
and
(1 ￿ ￿)Vipo (sipo) > (1 ￿ ￿)Vf (sipo) + (1 ￿ ￿ (sipo))[Vipo (sipo) ￿ Vf (sipo)]
From the observation that the sum of the LHS of the preceding inequalities equals the
sum of their RHS, it is clear that the two inequalities can hold simultaneously only when
they are both equalities. But this requires ￿ (sipo) = ￿, which generally will not be the case.
Instead, party a will threaten to veto the IPO if ￿ (sipo) > ￿, and party b otherwise. Party
a in the ￿rst case, and party b in the second, must therefore be denied the right to veto.
This is what demand rights do.
We have thus shown
Proposition 7 Demand rights deny the parties the ability to increase their share of the
payo⁄ by threatening to veto a value-increasing IPO.
Is there a need for tag-along rights in state sipo? Yes, to the extent that only a limited
fraction of the ￿rm can be sold in the IPO, and one founding party ￿ presumably the
majority owner M ￿ has the ability to include a disproportionate fraction of his own
shares in the o⁄ering. Tag-along rights then allow the other founding party to include his
shares in the o⁄ering in proportion to his stake in the ￿rm. In such context, tag-along rights
are referred to as piggy-back rights.
28A similar argument can be made when the alternative to the IPO is a trade sale.
19We can thus write
Proposition 8 Piggy-back rights deny the parties the ability to increase their share of the
payo⁄ by including a disproportionate fraction of their own shares in the ￿rm￿ s IPO.
8 Transfers as investment: Call options, put options and
catch-up clauses
We now transform the problem of ex post transfers into one of ex post investment. For that
purpose, and as noted in Section 2, we assume that ￿ < 0 and de￿ne ￿ ￿ ￿￿ > 0. In
contrast to ex post transfers, ex post investment is value-creating as it increases the value of
the ￿rm in use u 2 ft;fg and state s 2 fst;sfg from Vu (s)I to Vu (s)I (1 + ￿)￿￿Vu (s)I￿
(recall that 1
2 < ￿ < 1).
The analogue to Proposition 1 in the case of ex post investment can be shown. There
is still the need to maintain the founding parties￿shares of the ￿nal payo⁄. The payo⁄ is
Vf (sf)I (1 + ￿)￿￿Vf (sf)I￿ in state sf and Vt (st) in state st when it is party a that makes
the ex post investment. The payo⁄ is Vf (sf)I in state sf and Vt (st)I (1 + ￿)￿￿Vt (st)I￿
in state st when it is the trade buyer that makes the ex post investment.
We ￿rst consider the state sf in the case where it is party a that makes the ex post
investment. Recall from Section 3 the assumption that ￿ < ￿. Party a￿ s stake must
therefore be increased from ￿ < ￿ to ￿r ￿ ￿ for party a to be induced to make the ex post
investment. By analogy to Proposition 2 in Section 4.1, we can show that options at fair
value serve to change the founding parties￿stakes in the ￿rm while maintaining the parties￿
initial shares of the payo⁄. The di⁄erence with Section 4.1 is that there is now the need for
call options as well as put options. Whether party a has an option to call a stake ￿r ￿ ￿
from party b, or party b has an option to put a stake ￿r ￿ ￿ to party a, depends on the
relation between the parties￿stakes and their bargaining power.
To see this, note that the alternative to the exercise of the option is bargaining between
20the parties. The parties￿payo⁄s in bargaining are
￿Vf (sf)I + ￿ (sf)[Vf (sf)I (1 + ￿) ￿ ￿Vf (sf)I￿ ￿ Vf (sf)I]
and
(1 ￿ ￿)Vf (sf)I + (1 ￿ ￿ (sf))[Vf (sf)I (1 + ￿) ￿ ￿Vf (sf)I￿ ￿ Vf (sf)I]
These are to be contrasted with the parties￿payo⁄s from the exercise of the option, which
are ￿ (Vf (sf)I (1 + ￿) ￿ ￿Vf (sf)I￿) and (1 ￿ ￿)(Vf (sf)I (1 + ￿) ￿ ￿Vf (sf)I￿). When
￿ (sf) > ￿, party a clearly prefers bargaining to the exercise of the call option. Such
bargaining must be avoided. It can be avoided by granting party b the option to put the
stake ￿r￿￿ to a when ￿ (sf) > ￿. Conversely, when ￿ (sf) < ￿, it is a who must be granted
the option to call the stake ￿r ￿ ￿ from b.
Rather than repeating the analysis of Sections 4.2 and 5 for the case of ex post invest-
ment, we summarize the results for the two cases in Tables 1 (ex post transfers) and 2 (ex
post investment).
a can transfer t can transfer
sf put options tag-along rights
st drag-along rights
tag-along rights if (5) and/or (6) are true
drag-along rights if both (5) and (6) are false
Table 1: Circumstances and clauses in the case of ex post transfers
a invests t invests
sf put or call options no rights needed
st drag-along rights drag-along rights
Table 2: Circumstances and clauses in the case of ex post investment
There are two principal di⁄erences between Tables 1 and 2. We have already discussed
21the ￿rst, which is the absence of call options in Table 1. The second is the absence of tag-
along rights in Table 2. Both di⁄erences can be ascribed to the same basic phenomenon: ex
post transfers allow one founding party to pro￿t at the expense of the other party, whereas
ex post investment pro￿ts both parties. The purpose of put options and tag-along rights
in Table 1 is to protect the party at whose expense transfers would be, and to constrain
the party that would pro￿t from transfers. That latter party would be party a in case it
is party a that can engage in transfers, and the founding party that can exploit the trade
buyer￿ s ability to engage in transfers in case it is the trade buyer that has such ability. As
there is no such problem in the case of ex post investment, there is no need for tag-along
rights, and the choice between put and call options is determined by the relation between
the parties￿stakes and their bargaining power.
We have argued in Sections 4 and 5 that there is no scope for con￿ ict between the various
clauses in the case of ex post transfers. This remains true in the case of ex post investment,
with one exception: when party a has a call option and alone is aware of an impending trade
sale, a can exercise the option prior to the trade sale in order to pro￿t from the di⁄erence
between the price paid by the trade buyer and the fair value computed by an external expert
not yet aware of the trade sale to come. Doing so allows the trade buyer to increase his payo⁄
from the trade sale from ￿Vt (st)I to ￿rVt (st)I ￿(￿r ￿ ￿)[Vf (sf)I (1 + ￿) ￿ ￿Vf (sf)I￿].
Catch-up clauses deny a the ability to do so, by granting b a claim to the gain foregone as
a result of a￿ s exercise of the option.29
9 GM and Fiat
We now return to the joint venture contract between GM and Fiat described in the Intro-
duction. Recall that the contract grants Fiat the option to put its stake to GM and to drag
GM along in the case of a trade sale of Fiat Auto. It grants GM the right to tag along Fiat
in such case, as well as the right to demand of Fiat the listing of Fiat Auto.
29Why do catch-up clauses not apply when a founding party has exercised its put option? Presumably
because, unlike a call option, a put option does not a⁄ord its holder the opportunity to pro￿t from preceding
its partner and the external expert in acquiring information about a trade sale.
22On the basis of the joint venture contract and various newspaper and magazine articles,
we can explain the preceding clauses as follows. The joint venture contract commits GM and
Fiat to a number of collaborative ventures in Latin America and in Europe, in powertrain
operations, material purchasing activities, and back-o¢ ce facilities for automotive ￿nancing.
Beyond these speci￿c collaborative ventures and the ex ante investment they involve, there
is the issue of whether Fiat Auto can survive as an independent carmaker in an industry that
deems economies of scale to be all-important. In case the answer should be in the negative,
GM would appear to be a natural acquiror. As the acquisition of Fiat Auto by GM likely
would involve signi￿cant ex post investment by GM, which would need to integrate the
operations of Fiat Auto into its own, options are needed in line with the argument made
in Section 8. These take the form of put options held by Fiat rather than call options
held by GM, because a sale of Fiat Auto likely would take place under conditions of weak
bargaining power for Fiat.30
GM is not, however, the only potential acquiror of Fiat Auto.31 In case Fiat￿ s 80% stake
in Fiat Auto should be acquired by a party other than GM, that party may make an ex
post investment that bene￿ts GM as 20% shareholder in Fiat Auto, or engage in ex post
transfers at GM￿ s expense.32 As noted in Section 8, the ￿rst issue calls for Fiat￿ s right to
drag GM along. In line with our discussion in Section 5.2, the second issue calls for GM￿ s
right to tag along Fiat.
It is of course possible that Fiat Auto should remain independent. In such case, GM￿ s
demand rights provide GM with an exit route if exit should be desired. That it is GM
rather that Fiat that has the right to demand a listing is consistent with Fiat having very
high bargaining power in the state where Fiat Auto should remain independent.
Why does Fiat not have the right to tag along GM and GM the right to drag Fiat along
30The sale of Fiat Auto would be an admission of defeat by Fiat￿ s controlling Agnelli family, for whom
Fiat Auto ￿ founded in 1899 by a group of ex-cavalry o¢ cers that included Giovanni Agnelli ￿ has long
been the jewel in the family crown. Such sale can therefore be expected to take place only under very adverse
circumstances for Fiat.
31Indeed, Daimler-Chrysler had o⁄ered to buy Fiat Auto prior to the joint venture with GM.
32The acquiror would engage in ex post transfers in case ￿M = 80% < ￿. Recall that the subscript M
denotes the majority partner, the acquiror of Fiat￿ s stake in the present case.
23in case GM sells its stake in Fiat Auto? As noted in Sections 4.2 and 5.2, Fiat￿ s tag-along
rights would be made necessary by the possibility for the acquiror of GM￿ s minority stake to
engage in transfers. If the minority partner cannot engage in transfers, perhaps because of
control considerations, then there should be no need to grant Fiat any tag-along rights. As
noted in Section 5.1, GM￿ s right to drag Fiat along would be made necessary by the desire
on Fiat￿ s part to appropriate the entire gains made possible by the transfer of majority
ownership to the acquiror. This consideration may not be applicable to Fiat, which will
only consider selling Fiat Auto under very adverse circumstances, in which case its ability
to hold out on a trade sale is likely to be very low.33
10 Conclusion
We have presented an explanation for a number of key clauses that often appear in share-
holder agreements, such as those between partners in a joint venture and between a venture
capitalist and an entrepreneur. The clauses preserve the parties￿incentives to make ex ante
investments when ex post renegotiation may alter the parties￿shares of the payo⁄.
Many of the clauses we have discussed recall the rules and regulations that govern
tender o⁄ers and the sale of control blocks.34 For example, tag-along rights recall the
mandatory bid rule, which requires a bidder to bid for all the shares of a target, and the
equal opportunity rule, which requires the acquiror of a control block to o⁄er non-controlling
shareholders the same terms and conditions as o⁄ered the selling blockholder. Similarly,
drag-along rights recall squeezeouts, which allow the acquiror of a control block to ￿ squeeze￿
minority shareholders out of the ￿rm.
Yet, there are di⁄erences. Thus, the o⁄er made to target shareholders in a tender o⁄er
may take the form of a two-tier o⁄er, and the market rule rather than the equal opportunity
33An alternative explanation is that drag-along rights may be abused in case side payments from the
trade buyer to the minority partner, GM, are possible. We have not considered side payments in our
analysis because we have assumed that such payments would be invalidated by courts.
34See for example Bebchuk (1994), Bebchuk and Kahan (1999), Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997, 1998,
2000) Easterbrook and Fischel (1991), Hermalin and Schwartz (1996), Kahan (1993), and Romano (1992).
24rule governs the sale of control blocks in many jurisdictions, including the United States. In
contrast to the equal opportunity rule, the market rule does not impose on the acquiror of a
control block the requirement to extend his o⁄er to non-controlling shareholders. Finally, the
price at which minority shareholders are squeezed need satisfy only an appraisal standard,
which does not entitle minority shareholders to the premium o⁄ered the selling blockholder.
Why the di⁄erences? In the case of a tender o⁄er, the answer has to do with the need to
ensure that the acquisition is not precluded by the free rider problem (Grossman and Hart,
1980). But there should be no such problem in the case of the sale of a control block. In
that case, our analysis suggests that the di⁄erences we have mentioned are related to the
need to induce ex ante investment. Only a controlling blockholder makes such investment.
Small, dispersed shareholders do not, as they play no role in management. They therefore
make no investment beyond the price of their shares. That only the controlling blockholder
makes an ex ante investment, for example in bringing forth a value creating change of
control transaction, suggests that only the controlling blockholder should pro￿t from such
a transaction. This is in order to maintain his incentives to make the requisite investment.
The appraisal remedy, which e⁄ectively grants small shareholders the right to put their
shares to the ￿rm, ensures that small shareholders are not harmed by change of control
transactions, but also denies them the bene￿t of these transactions. The need to induce the
making of ex ante investment on the part of the controlling blockholder, and on his part
only, suggests that this is as it should be.
25Appendix 1: An overview of shareholder agreements
Standard shareholder agreements typically contain the following articles or groups of
articles (Bernstein, 1988; Freedman, 1994; Martel, 1991; Stedman and Jones, 1990):
￿ Termination of prior agreements between some or all shareholders regarding the or-
ganization and a⁄airs of the company, as well as warranties and covenants specifying
that all shares are free and clear of all claims.
￿ Provision of control: Designation of the rights and duties of the shareholders in the
management of the company, and requirement of prior unanimous consent for major
decisions such as the declaration of any dividend and the issuance or sale of shares.
￿ Restrictions on the transfer of shares: The shareholders commit not to sell, pledge, or
charge their shares except with the prior written consent of all other shareholders.
￿ Survivorship arrangements: Upon the death of any shareholder, the personal represen-
tatives of the deceased shall sell the shares of the deceased to the company, typically
at a price speci￿ed in the article on valuation. Life insurance policies will be issued
to the bene￿t of the shareholders to ensure that this article can be enforced.
￿ Valuation: The ￿ fair￿value of the shares is generally determined by an external expert,
or it is based on a previously agreed upon valuation formula.
￿ Right of ￿rst refusal: A shareholder o⁄ered to sell his shares to an outside investor at
some price is required to o⁄er his shares to the other shareholders at the same price.
If the other shareholders decline, the ￿rst shareholder is free to sell his shares to the
outside investor.
￿ Pre-emption rights: A shareholder wishing to sell his stake in the company is required
to o⁄er his shares to the other shareholders, typically at ￿fair value.￿These are usually
substitutes for, and less common than, rights of ￿rst refusal.
￿ Put options: A shareholder is granted put options on the shares held by the other
shareholders. The strike price is generally the ￿fair￿value of the shares.
26￿ Call options: Similar to put options.
￿ Catch up clauses: When a shareholder exercises a call option, the selling shareholder
maintains a claim on part of the payo⁄ subsequently realized by the ￿rst shareholder
in a trade sale or an IPO.
￿ Drag-along rights: In case a shareholder sells his stake to an outside investor, drag-
along rights grant the investor the right to buy out the other shareholders￿stakes at
the same price and on the same terms as the ￿rst shareholder￿ s stake. Drag-along
rights can be viewed as conditional call options granted the outside investor.
￿ Tag-along rights (or co-sale agreements): In case a shareholder sells his stake to an
outside investor, tag-along rights grant the other shareholders the right to require the
outside investor to buy these shareholders￿stakes at the same price and on the same
terms as the ￿rst shareholder￿ s stake. Tag-along rights can be viewed as conditional
put options granted all shareholders.
￿ Demand rights (or initial public o⁄ering clauses): Shareholders agree in advance the
circumstances in which they will take the company public. Demand rights ensure
that the company will be taken public once a prespeci￿ed level of pro￿t is achieved,
or when the company has a speci￿c need for outside ￿nance. Demand rights may
require all shareholders to participate in the o⁄ering.
￿ Piggy-back rights allow the parties to demand to be included in an IPO in proportion
to their stakes in the ￿rm.
￿ Non-competition: Each and every shareholder undertakes not to compete with the
￿rm.
￿ Dispute resolution and arbitration: The shareholders agree to follow a speci￿ed proce-
dure to resolve disputes. The procedure may specify the appointment of an arbitrator.
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These have ￿rst-order conditions
[pf￿Vf (sf) + pt￿Vt (st)]1ia6ib = caia
and
[pf (1 ￿ ￿)Vf (sf) + pt (1 ￿ ￿)Vt (st)]1ia>ib = cbib
where 1[:::] denotes the indicator function. The solution must satisfy ia = ib. It now su¢ ces
to note that setting ￿ = ca
ca+cb ￿ ￿0 yields the desired result.￿
Proof of Proposition 2: Let F denote the fair value of the ￿rm under the conditions
that result from the exercise of the option: F = Vf (sf)I. The strike price of the option
therefore equals (￿r ￿ ￿)Vf (sf)I, thereby ensuring that party b does indeed exercise the
put option.
The preceding implies that, when making the ex ante investments, the parties￿payo⁄s
conditional on the state sf being realized are
￿rVf (sf)I ￿ (￿r ￿ ￿)F = ￿rVf (sf)I ￿ (￿r ￿ ￿)Vf (sf)I = ￿Vf (sf)
for party a and (1 ￿ ￿)Vf (sf)I for party b. The parties￿payo⁄s have been maintained in
the initial proportions ￿ and 1 ￿ ￿.￿
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